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The security service

The security service is the enforcement and evidence plane of a cell. Where system provisions the cell's first keys, security runs the ongoing crypto lifecycle, the certificate authorities, rotation, custody, and revocation, and it is the home of the platform's policy enforcement, threat detection, SIEM, response, and compliance capabilities.

Feeds: Security Platform.

What it owns​

  • Crypto lifecycle: key rotation, renewal, and revocation over the life of the cell.
  • Certificate authorities: the CAs that issue and vouch for the identities everything else presents.
  • Key Custody: custody and controlled release of key material.
  • Enforcement policy: the policy that authorization and the refusal gate evaluate.
  • Threat detection: detection of hostile and anomalous activity.
  • SIEM: the tamper-evident audit and security-information plane; see SIEM.
  • Response: response and containment actions.
  • Compliance: attestation and compliance evidence.

Sub-modules (public names)​

Sub-moduleWhat it does
Certificate authoritiesIssue and vouch for cell and entity identities
Crypto lifecycleRotate, renew, and revoke keys over the cell's life
Key CustodyHold and controllably release key material
Enforcement PolicyThe policy evaluated at every authorization decision
Capability ControlAttenuable capability grants for principals, including agents
Threat DetectionDetects hostile and anomalous activity
SIEMTamper-evident audit and security information; see SIEM
Security & OperationsThe security operations console surface
Data Security PosturePosture assessment for data-plane controls
Identity FederationFederating identity across organizations; see identity
Session AdministrationAdministering live sessions and their revocation

APIs and surfaces​

security is not externally exposed. Its HTTP and gRPC control surfaces bind loopback (clear) and an internal mutual-TLS interface requiring a client certificate; external access is only ever through the node gate. Because security is the authority the other services consult, it is a depends_on of nearly every service in the cell's boot sequence.

Workers​

Background workers cover certificate rotation and expiry, revocation propagation, audit-chain maintenance, detection pipelines, and compliance evaluation. They run per cell with no coordinator.

The evidence chain​

Figure: the enforcement and evidence flow. Certificate authorities and the hash-chained SIEM record are drawn verified (green); the authorization / refusal gate is drawn amber because its defining behaviour is that it can refuse. Ceiling: refusal and hash-chained audit with counted gaps are shown; behavioural threat scoring is a detection input, not a claim of prediction.

Table equivalent

FromRelationshipToState
Certificate authoritiesvouch for identity intoAuthorization / refusal gateverified
Enforcement policyis evaluated byAuthorization / refusal gateneutral
Authorization / refusal gaterecords every decision toSIEMrefusal-capable
Threat detectionfeedsSIEM and Responseneutral
Responserecords actions toSIEMverified record

In the deployment matrix​

security runs identically in every corner. Single-cell, the CA and audit chain are wholly local. Multi-cell, revocation and federation propagate across cells, and each cell keeps its own tamper-evident chain with counted gaps rather than a shared mutable log. Sovereign / air-gapped, the entire lifecycle, issuance, rotation, detection, audit, runs with no external dependency, which is the corner the product is sold on.